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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
IN RE DWIGHT L. KING

{

Case No.
F-39

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
(UTAH STATE BAR)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
While respondent agrees that the statement of facts
submitted by petitioner in the Brief of Petitioner on pages
1 to 8 inclusive are substantially correct, it would appear
advisable to call the court's attention to some typographical
errors which appear therein. On page 3 of Petitioner's
Brief reference is made to an informal hearing held by the
Investigating Committee of the Utah State Bar on November 4, 1954. This meeting was held on December 4, 1954
(Exhibit P-3). On said page 3 reference is made in two
places to Exhibit T -3, the correct designation of said exhibit being P-3. Also, on page 7 of said brief reference is
made to Exhibits T-1 through T-6 whereas the correct designation of said exhibits is P-1 through P-7 (R. 0002).
In addition to Findings numbered 3 through 6 of the
Disciplinary Committee set out by petitioner on pages 7
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and 8 of their brief, respondent calls attention to Finding
No. 2 of the said Committee which is as follows:
2. That during the period from June 10, 1954,
until June 21, 1954, and for some time prior and subsequent thereto, the said Dwight L. King was one
of counsel for Harsh Utah, a corporation, in a case
entitled Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Company, a
corporation, et al., plaintiffs, vs. Harsh Utah, a Corporation, et al., defendants, Civil No. 5096, brought
in the District Court of Davis County, State of Utah,
(R. 0280).
Also, the Waiver of Notice of the Directors of Harsh
Utah Corporation and the Minutes of Special Meeting of
Harsh Utah Corporation are as follows:
WAIVER OF NOTICE OF DIRECTORS
OF
HARSH UTAH CORPORATION
We, the undersigned, being all of the duly
elected directors of Harsh Utah Corporation, hereby
do waive notice of the time and place and purpose
of a special meeting of the directors of said corporation and hereby fix the First day of April, 1953, as
the time and at the office of the Harsh Utah Corporation in Portland, Oregon, as the place for the
holding of said special meeting of directors, for the
purpose of considering the return of a contribution
to the capital surplus of said corporation.
Dated this 1st day of April, 1953.
HAROLD SCHNITZER
WALTER E. HUTCHINSON
MINUTES OF SPECIAL MEETING OF
DIRECTORS OF
HARSH UTAH CORPORATION
A special meeting of the Board of Directors of
Harsh Utah Corporation was held at the offices of
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the corporation in Portland, Oregon, on April 1,
1953, at 3 :00 o'clock P. M. The meeting was called
to order by the President, Mr. Harold J. Schnitzer,
and minutes of such meeting were recorded by the
Secretary, Mr. Walter E. Hutchinson.
The President stated that all directors had in
writing waived notice of said meeting and directed
that said waiver be attached to the minutes of the
meeting.
Mr. Schnitzer then stated that the purpose of
the meeting was to discuss the return of $624,994.00
which Mr. Schnitzer had contributed to the capital
surplus of the corporation on July 21, 1952, in order
to assist this corporation in its compliance with requirements of the Federal Housing Administration
in the closing of its insured mortgage loan.
Mr. Schnitzer then stated that in his opinion
the purposes for which said contribution to the capital surplus had been made were now consummated
and that it was no longer necessary that the corporation retain said contribution.
After some discussion, the directors being of
the unanimous opinion that it was no longer necessary that the corporation retain said capital contribution, the corporation adopted the following resolution:
RESOLVED, that since Harsh Utah Corporation has received the benefits accruing
from the advance of $624,994.00 to the corporation and that as it is no longer essential to the
business of the corporation that in continue to
retain said contribution, that the said capital
contribution of $624,994.00 be returned to Mr.
Schnitzer at this time, and that the books of
the corporation be set up in such manner as to
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reflect the return of said contribution to the
capital surplus of this corporation.
HAROLD SCHNITZER
President
WALTER E. HUTCHINSON
Secretary
(Exhibit P-4).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Respondent deems it advisable to answer the points
set out by petitioner numbering the said points as petitioner
has numbered his points as follows:

I.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE TO THE EFFECT THAT
PETITIONER DID NOT MAKE A DISCLOSURE OF THE FALSE TESTIMONY WITHIN
A REASONABLE TIME FROM THE DATE OF
SUCH FALSE TESTIMONY.
I-A.
PETITIONER WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN
REFRAINING FROM DIVULGING THE
TRUTH REGARDING PERJURED TESTIMONY IN ORDER "TO MAINTAIN INV I 0 L A T E THE CONFIDENCE" AND
"PRESERVE THE SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT" BECAUSE :

I

(a) PETITIONER'S CLIENT HAD
WAIVED THE PRIVILEGE PROHIB-
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5
ITING DISCLOSURE OF COMMUNICAT I 0 N S BETWEEN ATTORNEY
AND CLIENT; AND
PETITIONER'S FIRST D U T Y
WAS TO COURT AND NOT TO CLIENT.
I-B.
(b)

THE EVIDENCE DISCLOSES THAT PETITIONER DELIBERATELY REFRAINED
FROM DIVULGING THE TRUTH TO THE
COURT IN THE TRIAL OF CASE NO. 5096,
DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY,
CONCERNING PERJURED TESTIMONY
GIVEN BY HAROLD J. SCHNITZER, ONE
OF DEFENDANTS IN SAID CASE, AND
WALTER E. HUTCHINSON, SECRETARY
OF HARSH UTAH CORPORATION, ON
JUNE 10, 1954, UNTIL EVIDENCE OF THE
FALSITY OF SUCH TESTIMONY WAS
PRESENTED TO THE COURT BY OPPOSING PARTIES.
II.
THE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS JUSTIFY
THE CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONER VIOLATED THE PROVISIONS OF RULE III, SECTION 32, SUBSECTIONS 15 AND 41, REVISED
RULES OF THE UTAH STATE BAR, GOVERNING PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE, AS WAS CONCLUDED BY THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE.
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III.
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE BOARD OF BAR COMMISSIONERS THAT PETITIONER BE SUSPENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW
FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE TO THE EFFECT THAT
PETITIONER DID NOT MAKE A DISCLOSURE OF THE FALSE TESTIMONY WITHIN
A REASONABLE TIME FROM THE DATE OF
SUCH FALSE TESTIMONY.
Petitioner says that his position at the hearing of this
case was, and now is, that if he had a duty to disclose the
facts to the court and counsel he did so within a reasonable
time under all the facts and circumstances of the case
(Petitioner's Brief, p. 11).
The testimony of petitioner shows that he concluded
on June lOth, during the lunch hour of that day, which
was the day the perjury was committed, that the record
should be corrected and set right. He said:
"A. We concluded that the record should be
corre·ted during the lunch hour, before we even got
out of Wild Horse Charlie's, and that is what I told
Mr. Hutchinson to do. I told him to correct that
record and I told Mr. Schnitzer to do it too.
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That was the lOth, wasn't it?
"A. That was the day it occurred and there
wasn't any ifs, ands or buts about that, and there
wasn't any equivocation on the instructions. But
they didn't correct the record that afternoon and
that night we began to thresh around and try to
resolve the problems we were confronted with" (R.
pp. 0270-0271) .
"Q.

Petitioner's counsel stated:
"When the opportunity came to present his case
they corrected it" (R. 0063).
And the following appears to be pertinent:
"MR. COLTON: Is it your position that if the
evidence is immaterial then it isn't the responsibility
of counsel to disclose that even though it be immaterial?
"MR. NIELSON: We take that position but we
don't think we have to go that far. We say in any
event Mr. King had that problem in his mind and
he concluded he couldn't tell from what the authorities said as to his duty as to whether it was to his
client's advantage psychologically to disclose it all
and he did it at the most reasonable opportunity
when he thought he could gain some advantage from
it and not have it pulled out piecemeal by someone
on the opposition to make a big show about it" (R.
0195).
Also, Harold J. Schnitzer, petitioner's client, advised
Mr. Hutchinson at the lunch hour on June lOth to tell the
truth and honestly answer the qustions regarding the preparation and signing of the two documents in question (the
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Waiver and the Minutes containing the resolution). (Schnitzer's Deposition, pp. 13, 15 and 16.)
If petitioner had sincerly desired to correct the record
and reveal the truth concerning said perjured testimony, he
had ample opportunity to do so prior to June 21st, the date
that his witnesses Schnitzer and Hutchinson testified as
to the falsity of their previous testimony given on June lOth.
The record reveals that the perjury was committed by
Schnitzer on the morning of June lOth (Exhibit P-1, pp.
2 to 13, incl.) , and was committed by the witness Hutchinson on the afternoon of said day, June lOth (Exhibit P-1,
pp. 14 to 23, incl.). Petitioner called the said witness Mr.
Hutchinson to testify on the next day, June 11th, and examined him on said date on direct, redirect and further redirect examination (R. 0136). The 12th and 13th days of
June, the year being 1954, were Saturday and Sunday (R.
0135). On Monday, June 14th, the witnesses Miller and Ellis,
the latter being an employee of defendants Schnitzer and
Harsh Utah Corporation, and witness Goldberg were called
and examined by counsel opposing petitioner and were cross
examined by petitioner and petitioner then called and examined out of turn witness Isaacson (R. 0136 and R. 0139).
On Tuesday, June 15th the aforesaid witness Ellis was
called and examined by opposing counsel and cross examined by petitioner; later the aforesaid witness Goldberg
was recalled and examined, then cross examined by petitioner. On Wednesday, June 16th, witnesses Ellis and
Weber were again called and examined by opposing counsel
and petitioner cross examined witness Weber; plaintiff
Locke was then called and examined by opposing counsel
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and was cross examined by petitioner (R. 0137). On Thursday, June 17th, witness Shipler, a photographer, and witness
Goddard, a typewriting identity expert, were called by
opposing counsel to identify the aforesaid Waiver and Minutes (R. 0138), both of whom were cross examined by petitioner (R. 0139) ; defendant Schnitzer was then, said date
being June 17th, called and examined by opposing counsel
(R. 0139). On Friday, June 18th, defendant Schnitzer again
took the witness stand and was examined further by opposing counsel, cross examined, and recross examined, by
petitioner; then said witness Ellis was cross examined and
recross examined by petitioner. In the afternoon on this
day, June 18th, opposing counsel called and examined Mr.
Don H. Terry, the police officer from the City of Pasadena,
who testified regarding the installation by him of sound
equipment in room 904, Hotel Utah, later occupied by defendant Schnitzer and others and his listening to and recording of conversations which took place in said room.
Petitioner cross examined this witness (R. 0139-0140). June
19th and 20th, 1954, were Saturday and Sunday. On Monday, June 21st, petitioner cross examined and recross examined and further recross examined plaintiff Locke, a
portion of which had to do with the recordings testified to
by the aforesaid witness Terry (R. 0140). Then it was that
on the afternoon of June 21st petitioner examined the said
witnesses Schnitzer and Hutchinson, who then testified
under oath as to the falsity of their previous testimony
given on June lOth concerning the preparation and signing
of the said Waiver and Minutes containing the resolution
(Exhibit P-1, pp. 151-153 and 154-166 incl.).
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I-A.
PETITIONER WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN
REFRAINING FROM DIVULGING THE
TRUTH REGARDING PERJURED TESTIMONY IN ORDER "TO MAINTAIN !NV I 0 LA T E THE CONFIDENCE" AND
"PRESERVE THE SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT" BECAUSE:
(a) PETITIONER'S CLIENT HAD
WAIVED THE PRIVILEGE PROHIBITING DISCLOSURE OF COMMUNICAT I 0 N S BETWEEN ATTORNEY
AND CLIENT.
The said deposition of petitioner's client, Schnitzer,
(R. 0276) reveals that following the false testimony of
Mr. Schnitzer at the noon recess on June lOth there was
a conversation concerning the said false testimony between
petitioner, Mr. Wayne Black, Mr. Hutchinson, Secretary
of Harsh Utah Corporation, and Mr. Schnitzer at which
they discussed the examination of Mr. Sherman concerning
the preparation and signing of the aforesaid Waiver and
Minutes, and petitioner then told Mr. Hutchinson that if
he were questioned on the matter of these two documents he
should not feel embarrassed about the fact that he had not
prepared the minutes before coming to Salt Lake and to
admit very honestly that he had neglected to do so and that
he should very honestly answer the questions that Mr. Sherman gave without being ashamed of the fact that the minutes had not been prepared before. Mr. Schnitzer further
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testified that he himself told Mr. Hutchinson that "Mr.
King's advice was proper and that there was nothing wrong
in having failed to do something of that nature, since no
one was hurt and it had no bearing on the case" (Schnitzer
Deposition, pp. 13, 15 and 16).
Also, petitioner says that they had concluded that the
record should be corrected during the lunch hour even before they got out of Wild Horse Charlie's, wb'ich was on
the lOth of June, the day the perjury had been committed
(R. 0270).
Notwithstanding advice given to Mr. Hutchinson by
petitioner and by Mr. Schnitzer, petitioner's client, to tell
the whole truth on the afternoon of June lOth, this witness
testified falsely concerning the preparation and signing
of the said Waiver and Minutes thus corroborating the false
testimony which Mr. Schnitzer previously gave that morning.
From the foregoing, it would appear to be clear that
at this juncture of the case (afternoon of June lOth) petitioner's client, Mr. Schnitzer, had authorized that the whole
truth concerning the preparation and signing of the said
Waiver and Minutes should be divulged to the court and
thus had waived any prohibition regarding the disclosure
of the communications between him as client and petitioner
as attorney.
At 58 Am. Jur., pages 292-293, appears the following
statement regarding communications between attorney and
client, which appears to be the law on the said subject:
"WITNESSES: The right to prohibit disclosure of communication between attorney and client
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belongs to the client and not to the attorney. The
privilege may be waived and the waiver may be
either express or implied by the conduct of those
entitled to its benefits."
(b) PETITIONER'S FIRST D U T Y
WAS TO COURT AND NOT TO CLIENT.
In thetJ.ight of the announced present position of petitioner to the effect that he disclosed to the court the facts
on which perjured testimony had been previously given
within a reasonable time under all facts and circumstances
of the case, it would appear that petitioner does not now
seriously contend that his primary duty was to keep the
confidences of his client and refrain from divulging the
same to the court.
It is well settled that the fidelity which a lawyer owes
to his client must not be allowed to override the duty which
devolves upon an attorney to deal honorably with the court
of which he is an officer, and to inform it on the law and
the facts of a case in which he appears; in Thornton on Attorneys at Law, Vol. 2, p. 1235, Sec. 822, this duty on the
part of a lawyer is recited and this authority further states
that the lawyer violates his oath of office when he resorts
to deception or permits his client to do so. (Italics added.)
This authority further says:
"An attorney is never justified in continuing a
case after he has knowledge of the fact that it is
being supported by perjured testimony; and if he
proceeds with the trial thereafter, without acquainting the court of the fact that the testimony is false,
and seeks to recover judgment on such testimony,
his misconduct merits his disbarment."
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We further call attention to the following provisions
of Revised Rules of the Utah State Bar governing professional conduct and discipline which are pertinent, in addition to Rule III, Sec. 32, sub-paragraphs 15 and 41, upon
which the said Disciplinary Committe relied, to-wit:
"RULE II
"Conduct Prescribed by Statute.
Section 21. "It is the duty of an attorney and counselor:
"4. To employ, for the purpose of maintaining
the causes confided to him, such means only as are
consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead
the judges by any artifice or false statement of fact
or law;" Title 78-51-31, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
Treble Damages.
Section 22. "An attorney or counselor shall not:
"5. Take part in deceit or collusion, or consent
thereto with intent to deceive a court or judge or a
party to an action or proceeding." Title 78-51-26,
( 4), Utah Code Annotated 1953.
"RULE III
"Conduct Prescribed by Rule.
Section 32. "The following Rules compr1s1ng the
Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association,
together with such interpretations thereof as may
be promulgated by the Board of Commissioners of
the Utah State Bar with the approval of the Supreme Court, were promulgated and prescribed for
the conduct of the members of the Utah State Bar:

"*

* *
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"29.

Upholding the Honor of the Profession.

"* * * The counsel upon the trial of a cause
in which perjury has been committed owe it to the
profession and to the public to bring the matter to
the knowledge of the prosecuting authorities."
I-B.
THE EVIDENCE DISCLOSES THAT PETITIONER DELIBERATELY REFRAINED
FROM DIVULGING THE TRUTH TO THE
COURT IN THE TRIAL OF CASE NO. 5096,
DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY,
CONCERNING PERJURED TESTIMONY
GIVEN BY HAROLD J. SCHNITZER, ONE
OF DEFENDANTS IN SAID CASE, AND
WALTER E. HUTCHINSON, SECRETARY
OF HARSH UTAH CORPORATION, ON
JUNE 10, 1954, UNTIL EVIDENCE OF THE
FALSITY OF SUCH TESTIMONY WAS
PRESENTED TO THE COURT BY OPPOSING PARTIES.
Contrary to the aforesaid contentions of petitioner, the
record reveals clearly that petitioner deliberately refrained
from divulging the truth regarding the aforesaid perjured
testimony until virtually forced to do so by the evidence
submitted by his opposing counsel through the aforesaid
witnesses Shipley, Goddard and Terry. In this regard attention is directed to Exhibit P-3, which is the transcript
of the hearing before the Utah State Bar Investigating Committee of the Third Division, consisting of five lawyers in
said Division, held December 4, 1954. At this hearing peti-
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tioner made a voluntary statement under oath he being
"interested in having the Committee here, hear what I have
to say and at the earliest date possible" (Exhibit P-3, page
6).

After petitioner had explained in some detail what he
considered to be the facts pertaining to the preparation and
signing of the aforesaid Waiver of Notice and Minutes
of Special Meeting of Directors of Harsh Utah Corporation
and the false testimony submitted to the court by his client,
Mr. Schnitzer, and by the witness, Mr. Hutchinson, Secretary of the Harsh Utah Corporation, the following answers
were made by petitioner to the following questions submitted by members of the said Committee :
"MR. BOYLE: What was your feeling right
after you had told Hutchinson, in no uncertain
terms, you wanted him to tell the truth about this
matter, and then in the afternoon session he completely disregarded your instructions? Did you have
any feeling then you should inform the Court, or
withdraw, or call a recess, or do anything of that
kind?
"MR. KING: I did not feel any responsibility
for him. As I say, he is an attorney. I did not offer
his testimony, and I disavowed it, and when we
started our other case, the first two witnesses we
put on,-Mr. Hutchinson and Mr. Schnitzer-and
of course here the problem occurred. Some people
said, 'We think that an attorney, when he was disgusted, should have gotten up and said, 'Wait a
minute now, that is false'".
"Maybe I should have. I did not think about
doing that at the time, either with Hutchinson or
Schnitzer. I do not believe if I was examining, I
would permit them to tell a lie, I knew was a lie,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
and not make them correct it, while under my examination.
"MR. BOYLE: You feel there is a substantial
difference then in the fact Sherman was examining
rather than you examining?
"MR. KING: I do not think I had that feeling
at that time. I-that is an after-thought. In other
words, at that time I did not have this thing even
thought out in my own mind, but, the question
occurs to me, as I look back over it, I do not know
whether I should have, on Schnitzer, said, 'Wait a
minute now, you are either going to tell the truth
or I am withdrawing as your counsel', or, 'That is
false and perjured testimony you are giving there.'
Maybe I had a duty as an attorney to confess to the
Court a crime which he was committing in the presence of the Court. Maybe I had that duty, as far
Mr. Hutchinson was concerned. I don't know, Mark.
I was not Mr. Hutchinson's counsel, I did not in any
way represent him at that time. I was Mr. Schnitzer's counsel, and the attorney-client relationship
being such as it is, I did not believe, and I do not
believe now, that I would have the superior duty to
the Court or the superior duty to Mr. Schnitzer.
"In other words, even though I knew, in the
presence of the Court, he was committing a crime,
if it was a crime, if perjury--even if I knew he was
- I doubt as counsel, as long as I remain in this
position, that I would have the superior duty to the
Court. I think my duty to him is to protect his interest and keep his conduct and conversation and
disclosure to me confidential at all times-is superior to my duty as an officer of the Court.
"I base that on what Judge Murray said up
here when we had one of these Bar Associations. He
said, 'Well we all say a lawyer is an officer of the
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Court, but he is primarily, and his first duty as an
advocate and as counsel is for his client.'
"Now so far as Mr. Schnitzer is concerned, that
is my feeling about it, and I do not believe that I
would have been justified in disavowing, or saying
to the Court, 'Now wait a minute, Mr. Schnitzer,
you are telling a lie under oath' and I don't know,
Mr. Hutchinson is a little different than it is with
Mr. Schnitzer, but with Hutchinson, he is an attorney.
"MR. DRAPER: Didn't you, in fact, represent
the corporation of which Mr. Schnitzer was President and Hutchinson was secretary?
"MR. KING: Yes, I did, but I don't knowdoes that make me represent Hutchinson?
"MR. DRAPER: I do not know.
"MR. BOYLE : This is not the place, probably,
to argue the case. I would like to make this observation, and see what you think of it. It seems to me,
under your explanation, that you feel your duty to
your client, is superior to your duty to the Court
under these circumstances. Doesn't that, in effect,
do away with any question of having your witness
or client give perjured testimony, if that duty overrides the duty to have him tell the truth, or see the
truth is told ; then under those circumstances, there
would be no objection to ever giving perjured testimony through your own client? Certainly, that is
not the situation we practice under.
"MR. KING: That would be suborning a witness to testify falsely. The distinction, as I see it,
Mark, is this. We did not tell, nor procure, nor approve, nor condescend, or even acquiesce in Mr.
Schnitzer's telling false testimony. Mr. Black and
I would never be a party to that, and it is not pos-
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sible. Anyone who would say we discussed that with
him, or condoned what they were doing, if we were
we would be, as I understand it, guilty of suborning
a witness to perjury, even though our client. But
once the client commits a crime in our presence, then
do we have the duty to disclose all we know about
the thing, and in effect, convict our own client? I
don't know. If we do have, we did not perform that
kind of a duty. Certainly at the moment he said he
did not remember, we knew, if he was an ordinary
person, he did remember. So, so far as knowing that
he did, of course we did.
"As I look back on it-of course hindsight is
always better than foresight-as I look back on it,
there may have been-we may have been able to
prevent it by getting up and saying, 'If you want
to know about that, why that was prepared this
morning' and so on, but it did not occur to us at that
time-it did not occur to me at that time, because
this thing came so-well sort of slid out of Schnitzer. He was always leading up to a certain point,
and then he was all the way in" (Exhibit P-3, pps.
36, 37, 38, 39).
Later at the said hearing petitioner made the following
answers to the following questions regarding his failure to
"set the record straight", to-wit:
"MR. KING: We knew all of the time that
what he was saying was not a fact.
"MR. HATCH : Was there any discussion between you and Schnitzer and Hutchinson as to the
possibility of setting the record straight as to that
date?
"MR. KING: I did so remark on it myself. I

think right after, within the next day or so, and
discussed it with Mr. Roberts. I do not know if he

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
will remember or- not. I did discuss it though, as to
whether- or not it would do us any good to have these
witnesses go back on the witness stand and correct
their testimony, and I did my research and discover-ed that a very serious conflict of authority and one
authority said it did not do a damned bit of good to
put him back and have him correct it, and the Supreme Court of the United States in a case involving
a Senator from Nebraska has held (Senator Norris)
that since the word is out, it does not do you any
good to correct it at all. (Italics supplied.)
"MR. CROFT: What do you mean it does not
do you any good?
"MR. KING: It does not purge your report.
"MR. CROFT : It did not remove the perjury
from the record?
"MR. KING: That is right, it does not purge
the record of the false statement to correct it, and
with that in mind, we did not want to jeopardize Mr.
Schnitzer, by having it go in and admit that he made
false statements; and Mr. Hutchinson, likewise, was
jeopardizing them both, so with that in mind, we
could see there wasn't-as far as correcting it, it
would not be clearly remov.ed-would not remove the
perjury from the record. (Italics added.)
"MR. DRAPER: Why didn't you put them on
after it broke, to admit all these things?
"MR. KING: Afterwards, once the fat was in
the fire, then of course, it was to their interest to
admit it; even though it did not purge the record, it
would make for a much more salutary defense before
any jury, if they had admitted it. In other words,
we could not do them any damage then. The proof
was in that they had committed perjury, but before
that time, it would have been very seriously preju-
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dicial to have them go back on and admit they had
committed this so-called crime, and in an effort to
purge the record, when it would not be purged, according to the Supreme Court of the United States"
(Exhibit P-3, pp. 68 and 69). (Italics added.)
The following further took place at said hearing:
"MR. HATCH: After thinking this over, and
reconsidering on the matter of the perjury, you determined in your own opinion, your duty was to protect your client against a criminal aspect regardless
of the way it would affect others?
"MR. KING: I don't think hardly that is what;
I still thought, and I still am of the opinion, that this
was an immaterial matter, and I considered it my
duty not to jeopardize, unnecessarily, perhaps, their
interests. Frankly-and I don't now-frankly believe that this particular fact has any materiality at
all in the trial of this lawsuit, nor would have affected Judge Cowley's decision one way or the other.
It should not have. It didn't make any difference, so
I concluded, after my research, that to put them
back on, would serve no purpose, so far as they were
concerned, and would seriously jeopardize their position" (Exhibit p ..3, p. 70).
Petitioner further testified at the hearing before the
Disciplinary Committee as follows:
"A. No, I don't think we didn't know which
way to turn. We were very much aware that these
men were in an extremely dangerous position. That
they were men of substance and character in the
community and there was a very difficult problem.
First we had this job of informing the court concerning the truth of the matter and as a secondary
consideration we had the welfare of Mr. Hutchin-
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son. You might not know it but he is about sixty
years old, a very dignified appearing person, and
an intelligent man and I considered very carefully
the course we were to take" (R. 0270).
The aforesaid statements of petitioner reveal conclusively that petitioner, after deliberation and careful consideration, concluded that he had the primary duty to his
client to retain the confidences of his client which he did
until "once the fat was in the fire", referring, it would
appear, to the evidence adduced by the opposition regarding
the perjured testimony, after which petitioner considered
it to be in his client's interest to admit the false statements
even though such admission did not purge the record, according to the holding in the aforesaid Norris case ( U. S.
v. Norris, 300 U. S. 564).
Bearing out petitioner's above statements, and contrary
to his present announced position, petitioner continued to
resist the introduction of evidence to correct the record
until it became entirely clear, through evidence adduced by
his opposition, as to the perjured testimony of witnesses
Schnitzer and Hutchinson.
Through the testimony of both witnesses Shipler, the
photographer, and Goddard the typewriter expert, on June
18th, petitioner refrained from revealing the complete truth
to clear the record of perjury. During the testimony of the
said witness Goddard, petitioner stated :
"MR. KING: I don't want to interfere, but as
to the typewriter, I think Mr. Hutchinson left our
office and dictated those minutes.
"MR. SHERMAN: On what date, and what
type of stipulation would you like to make?
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"MR. KING: I don't know when he did it, or
the exact date.
"MR. SHERMAN : I will continue with the examination, unless you want to make a complete stipulation the documents were prepared by Mr. Hutchinson, yourself, Mr. Black and Mr. Schnitzer in your
office.
"MR. KING: Mr. Hutchinson, I understand(sentence not completed by Mr. King).
"MR. SHERMAN : I offer the stipulation, and
you can either leave or take it, that stipulation is
that you, yourself, and Mr. Schnitzer, Mr. Black
and Mr. Hutchinson were there?
"MR. KING: I won't stipulate to that. I had
nothing to do with preparing the minute.
"MR. SHERMAN : Your contention is you had
nothing to do with it?
"MR. KING: I knew Mr. Hutchinson was going
to use our girl to do it.
"MR. SHERMAN : It was done last week in
your office?
"MR. KING: It was done about on the 5th.
"MR. SHERMAN : I will continue the examination for the purpose of the record, I would prefer
to have it testified to.
"MR. KING: 0. K.
"THE COURT: Go ahead" (Exhibit P-2, pages
224 and 225) .
On June 18th, in the afternoon, the aforesaid detective,
Don H. Terry of Pasadena, California, testified of the installing by him of sound equipment in Room 904 of the
Hotel Utah on the night of June 6th and of his exclusive
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operation and control of the same to the date of his testimony. He listened and made recordings of conversations
which took place in the said room from June 7th to June
18th (Exhibit P-1, pp. 52 to 54).
Petitioner objected to the testimony of Mr. Terry as
being unlawfully obtained (Exhibit P-1, p. 55). There was
discussion as to the admissibility of such evidence and the
court held it to be admissible (Exhibit P-1, p. 60). It was
agreed to produce the records from which the transcription
was taken (Exhibit P-1, p. 60). Petitioner thereafter
stated:
"MR. KING: I want that platter on which
you have that I was ever mentioned or any word
was ever said to me in that room, and I want it right
now.
"Q. You'll have it, Mr. King, and it will show
you and Mr. Walter Hutchinson were in a conversation about the resolution, to leave and go to your
office and prepare it.
"MR. KING: It won't, Mr. Sherman.
"Q. We'll get that Mr. King. We have it" (Exhibit P-1, p. 63).

Again petitioner objected to the testimony of Mr.
Terry on the basis of attorney-client relationship. He said:
"MR. KING: We are resisting, your Honor,
the admission of this evidence on the ground that
it's in violation of the rights of the parties. We
would also call the court's attention to another right
that has been violated, and that the privilege of attorney-client relationship, especially with Mr.
Schnitzer, and we object" (Exhibit P-1, p. 64-4).
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Again petitioner objected to the testimony of Mr. Terry
on the basis of attorney-client relationship as follows:
"Q. And can you identify who was in the room
at that time?
"THE COURT: What time did you say?
"A. 8:47 A. M. June lOth.
"Q. And who was in the room at that time?
"A. Mr. King, Mr. Hutchinson, Mr. Schnitzer;
and Mr. King, Mr. Hutchinson and Mr. Schnitzer.
"Q.

"A.

All right. Will you state what was said?
Mr. King said: 'Using all of this, * * *'

"MR. KING: (interposing) We are not waiving any objection, including attorney-client relationship to this conversation. Go ahead" (Exhibit P-1,
pp. 65 and 66).
II.
THE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS JUSTIFY
THE CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONER VIOLATED THE PROVISIONS OF RULE III, SECTION 32, SUBSECTIONS 15 AND 41, REVISED
RULES OF THE UTAH STATE BAR, GOVERNING PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE, AS WAS CONCLUDED BY THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE.
Petitioner has quoted the subsections involved and further quotation appears unnecessary.
With the said subsections in mind, the following cases
appear to be in point in this matter:
People v. Beattie (Ill.) 27 N. E. 1096.
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In this case the lawyer involved drew a complaint in
divorce falsely stating his client was a resident of Illinois
and allowed her to testify, though he knew the same to be
false. He also introduced other evidence that would have
been inadmissible if his client had not given such false testimony. While the activities of Mr. Beattie were shown to be
of such a nature as to cause the court to conclude that he
"procured" false evidence, and in that sense may be beyond
the facts in the instant case, the court comments on his
sitting by and allowing his client to testify falsely and said
on page 1103:
"The lawyer's duty is of a double character. He
owes his client the duty of fidelity, but he also owes
the duty of good faith and honorable dealing to the
judicial tribunals before whom he practices his profession. He is an officer of the court-a minister
in the temple of justice. His high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts
of the case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He violates his oath of
office when he resorts to deception or permits his
clients to do so." (Italics added.)
In Re Mendelsohn, 135 N. Y. S. 438 (1912), the attorney's father-in-law testified falsely and the attorney conducting the trial heard this testimony without attempting to
correct it, but allowed the trial to continue without calling
any attention to the fact that the witness was testifying
falsely. The attorney stated that he was so shocked at hearing the false testimony and by the realization of the fact
that the witness was guilty of perjury that he lost his head
and so did not attempt to correct the erroneous testimony.
The court described this as indefensible.
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On page 441 the court said:
"This is too flagrant a violation of the duty imposed upon an attorney and counselor at law by his
acceptance of the office to overlook. If he was willing to sacrifice his professional duty to save his
father-in-law from danger because of the crime that
he had committed, he certainly is not a proper person to be a member of the profession.-We concur
with the referee in stating that his explanation is
absolutely unsatisfactory, that it really explained
nothing, and that his misconduct stands out in bold
relief without excuse or palliation."
In re Taylor (Ky.) 189 S. W. (2d) 403 (1945). Taylor
a lawyer in Kentucky, who had had considerable trouble
and bore a bad reputation, permitted a lady to testify falsely
that she was his wife and to procure a divorce and then
endeavored to have the decree entered, knowing the testimony to be false. He later explained that he had boarded
at the home of this lady and it had been rumored in the
community that they were married and she wanted a divorce because "that will make it all right and keep down
suspicion, and protect my reputation". For this reason he
had consented to the proceedings and declined to cross examine her, she being represented by counsel. On page 404
the court said :
"There is no occasion to hunt through the law
books for authorities to support the conclusion that
the conduct of the respondent was reprehensible and
in violation of his obligation as a member of the bar.
He is guilty of deceit and assisting to perpetrate a
fraud upon the court. There is no condonation. The
respondent's explanation is weak-. Is this conduct
not as reprehensible as knowingly exhibiting to the
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court false affidavits in an effort to obtain some
advantage for a client or knowingly and deliberately
presenting perjured testimony; or having a certificate to a legal paper falsely executed? These have
been deemed sufficient causes for disbarment",
and cites 5 Am. Jur., Attorneys at Law, Sections 262 and
263. The court also cites the annotation at 14 A. L. R. 868.
In quoting from the above indicated Beattie case the court
said that a lawyer "owes the duty of good faith and honorable dealing to the judicial tribunals before whom he practices his profession. He is an officer of the court,-a minister in the temple of justice. His high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the
case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct
conclusions. He violates his oath of office when he resorts
to deception or permits his clients to do so." (Italics added.)
In Re Goodrich (Vt.) 11 A. (2d) 325. In this case the
attorney prepared, or caused to be prepared, a "libel for
divorce" in which plaintiff alleged and later testified in
court that "during said coveture she on her part had faithfully kept the marriage covenant and performed all of the
duties appertaining thereto" and the attorney well knew
she had previously entered a plea of guilty to adultery. The
attorney claimed he did not know or realize the law of
Vermont prevented a person from getting a divorce on any
ground .who had been guilty of adultery. On page 326 the
court said:
"There is nothing in the duty of diligence which
a lawyer owes to his client which in any way makes
it necessary, under any circumstances, for him to
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practice, or permit to be practiced, a fraud on the
court." (Italics added.)
Annotation 14 A. L. R. 868, Attorneys, Presenting or
permitting false evidence as ground for disbarment or suspension. At this citation appears the following general
statement:
"It cannot be tolerated that an attorney present
or permit (italics added) evidence, pleadings, or
affidavits on behalf of his client which he knows to
be false. And such misconduct is ample ground for
disbarment."
There is cited the case of In re: Hardenbrook, 121 N. Y. S.
250, in which it was held that an attorney, who was not the
attorney of record, who proceeded with a trial in silence
after discovering that his client had testified falsely and
that her claim was based upon such perjured testimony,
should be disbarred. In that case the court said :

"* * * Nor is it essential, in order that the
disciplinary powers of the court may be exercised,
that the attorney should be guilty of a violation of
the penal law; but it is sufficient if it appears that
he had a direct know ledge of the fact that his client
sought to recover on perjured testimony, and, notwithstanding such relief, continued the suit and insisted on recovery."
5 Am. Jur., Attorneys at Law, page 419, paragraph

263:
"An attorney may be suspended or disbarred
for-offering in evidence as valid an instrument
which he knows is not valid and lawful-for using
as evidence documents known by him to be fabri-
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cated, or testimony known to him to be false and
perjured."

In re Carroll (Ky.) (1951)-244 S. W. (2d) 474, an
attorney was charged with the violation of Canon No. 41
of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association which require a lawyer to rectify discovered
fraud or deception used to impose unjustly upon the court
or a party. Said Canon 41 is the same as our Rule III (Conduct Prescribed by Rule), Section 32, paragraph 41.
The attorney involved represented the husband in a divorce action before the court and when his client was asked
concerning his property he testified that he owned no property whatsoever excepting an old automobile. This answer
was false and the attorney knew it to be false because the
attorney was then holding real property in trust for the
client. On page 4 74 the court states:
"Under any standard of proper ethical conduct
an attorney should not sit by silently and permit his
client to commit what may have been perjury and
which certainly would mislead the court and the opposing party of a matter vital to the• issue under
consideration",
and cites In re Taylor (Ky.) 189 S. W. (2d) 403.
Respondent claimed, among other defenses :
(1)

That he had a duty not to divulge the confidence of his client ;

(2)

That the matter involved was immaterial,
and
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(3)

That he did not violate Canon 41 because
the opposing party knew that Robinson
was claiming an interest in the property
concerned.

Concerning defense (1) the court said on page 475:
"This duty to the client, of course, does not
extend to the point of authorizing collaboration with
him in the commission of fraud."
On defense (2) the court held it was the duty of the
husband to make a full disclosure and said on page 475:
"Even if we could say that the false testimony
of Robinson did not affect the award, it was still
fraud upon the court and the opposing party."
Concerning defense (3) the court stated on page 475:
"It may be true that prior to the hearing, in
connection with another matter, respondent and opposing counsel had discussed the question of whether
or not Robinson was actually the owner, * * *
Both he and the court had a right to rely upon Robinson's sworn testimony. Any proper sense of fair
dealing would have impelled respondent at least to
state for the record and for the court's information
the fact that a controversy existed on the question
of ownership."

In re Hargis, (Ky.) (1945), 190 S. W. (2d) 333. The
attorney in this case claimed that he did not know his client
and a witness for his client had testified falsely regarding
the client's residence in Kentucky (as he was later shown
to have resided in Ohio) until after the divorce proceedings
were heard but before the court entered judgment and did
not divulge to the court the fact because he understood a
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reconciliation between the parties was likely. The court
said on page 338 :
"That the respondent made no such disclosure to
the court, tends to confirm the conclusion of the trial
committee that the respondent himself was a party
to the attempted fraud on the court from its inception. But whether that be so or not, respondent has
clearly shown by his own testimony that he became
a party to his client's attempted fraud when, admittedly in possession of the facts, he failed to disclose them to the court."
Petitioner cites the case of In re Hoover (Ariz. 1935)
46 P. (2) 647 to support his position and quotes therefrom
on page 34 of petitioner's brief. While the Supreme Court
of Arizona did not think that the attorney's conduct merited disbarment, suspension or reproval, such conclusion
appears to have been based upon the attorney's inexperience
and lack of ethical appreciation, that court having stated:
"Plainly it was respondent's duty, when his client incorrectly and falsely stated that he bought the
medicine himself, to endeavor by questions put to
him to elicit the correct and truthful answer. This
duty he owed to his client, to the court, and to himself. While a lawyer owes the duty to his client of
seeing that his rights are fully protected under the
forms of the law, he is never justified in imposing
upon the court or knowingly permitting his client to
do so by testifying falsely. We think that an experienced right-thinking lawyer, under the circumstances, would have felt impelled to take steps, before his client left the witness stand or during the
trial, to have him correct his testimony. * '~ *
We are satisfied if like circumstances ever arise in
his practice he will act more ethically and more
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wisely." (Italics added.)
tation.)

(Pp. 649-650 of above ci-

III.

THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE BOARD OF BAR COMMISSIONERS THAT PETITIONER BE SUSPENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW
FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS.
Respondent takes the position in this matter that the
offense of which petitioner is charged is of sufficient seriousness to warrant careful consideration by the court. The
quantum of punishment, however, is a matter within the
discretion of the court. In the light of the facts, cases and
rules submitted it appears that the recommendation of the
Bar Commissioners should be sustained.
Petitioner places considerable emphasis on the statement of Mr. Black, associate attorney of Mr. King, quoted
on pages 47 and 48 of petitioner's brief, in which Mr. Black
indicates he has yet to see one single counsel stand forth
immediately and without question, either before the court
or in the chamber of the court, and denounce the perjury,
-suggests that if such procedure be proper "we ought to
be educated to that fact", and further says that he knows
"of no such counsel who has such a shining armor of virtue
that he has been doing that in this community or in any
other community".
Respondent does not have either the disposition or the
means of refuting this statement, since it appears to be
based upon Mr. Black's own experience, but it should be
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pointed out that Mr. Black is not entirely disinterested in
this matter and appears to be endeavoring to find excuse
rather than approval for petitioner's acts. His view does
not appear to be shared by all attorneys in this vicinity,
as appears from the recommendation of the Investigating
Committee (R. 0006 and 0007), the findings and conclusions of the Disciplinary Committee (R. 0279 to 0281) and
the recommendation of the Board of Bar Commissioners
(R. 0282), Utah State Bar, all being made up of attorneys
at law practicing in this community. The statement to petitioner of Mr. Boyle, Chairman of the aforesaid Investigating Committee, in this regard deserves emphasis:
"MR. BOYLE: This is not the place, probably, to
argue the case. I would like to make this observation, and see what you think of it. It seems to me,
under your explanation, that you feel your duty to
your client, is superior to your duty to the Court
under these circumstances. Doesn't that, in effect,
do away with any question of having your witness
or client give perjured testimony, if that duty overrides the duty to have him tell the truth, or see the
truth is told; then under those circumstances, there
would be no objection to ever giving perjured testimony through your own client? Certainly, that is
not the situation we practice under" (Exhibit P-3,
p. 38).
Petitioner told the Investigating Committee of the Bar
that "Mr. Schnitzer had destroyed any confidence the court
could have had prior to June lOth and on too numerous occasions to mention, simply by saying 'I don't know, I don't
remember, God, I forgot.' He was just hedging, dodging
and equivocating." Mr. King told him to be honest and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34
state his position frankly "Because if you do not you are
going to destroy the confidence of the court in you and if
you destroy the confidence of the court in you, our chance
of getting fair and adequate consideration of your case is
destroyed by the same token" (Ex. P -3, pages 23-24) .
On June 9th, Mr. John Sherman, attorney for Mr.
Locke, had called Mr. Schnitzer under the rule governing
examination of adverse witnesses. On the morning of June
lOth, at the time when Mr. Schnitzer resumed the witness
stand for testimony, Mr. Sherman stated into the record
"Now you have been able to locate-! believe
your testimony was yesterday, that there were minutes of the directors meeting and that they were
held in Portland and that you had them at the hotel.
"Answer: (By Schnitzer) "We are glad to
produce them this morning" (Ex. P-1, page 27).
On the evening of June 9th, Mr. Hutchinson, who was
an attorney at law and was secretary of Harsh Utah Corporation, a resident of Portland, Oregon, arrived in Salt
Lake City from Portland, to be a witness in the case at
the request of Mr. Schnitzer. Apparently Mr. Hutchinson
had not been in Salt Lake City during the trial prior to this
time and he again left Salt Lake on the 11th of June, (after
testifying at the instance of petitioner on June 11th), returning to testify on June 21st.
In view of the fact that Mr. King had lost confidence
in Mr. Schnitzer's willingness to tell the truth without evasion or perjury, it would appear that petitioner was not
justified in reposing too much confidence in what Mr.
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Schnitzer might do. Under these circumstances, Mr. King
was called to the Hotel Utah to have breakfast with Schnitzer, Hutchinson and others on the morning of June lOth.
It was at that time and place that it was decided that it
was necessary to prepare minutes and a waiver in Mr.
King's office that morning before going to court at Farmington. Mr. King knew that minutes and a waiver were
being prepared covering a meeting held some time prior
thereto in Portland, Oregon. The waiver of notice and the
minutes containing the resolution of Harsh Utah Corporation are signed by Harold Schnitzer, president, and W. E.
Hutchinson as secretary, and while the minutes do not show
on their face the date of their preparation, the waiver is
dated April 1, 1953.
When Mr. Schnitzer went on the stand on June lOth
he took these documents with him and they were introduced
in evidence as part of the minutes of the corporation, then
Mr. King told the court that these were part of Mr. Hutchinson's files (Ex. P-1, page 2-3).
Though it may appear from the record that petitioner
did not specifically advise Mr. Schnitzer and Mr. Hutchinson to testify that the documents had been prepared and
signed at a time prior to June lOth, the date of said preparation and signing, it is clear that if Mr. King had given
the matter careful consideration before the documents were
introduced in court, he should have anticipated that Schnitzer was going to try to leave the impression with the court
that these documents had been prepared and signed in
Portland, Oregon at a previous date.
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If Mr. King had examined the documents prepared in
his office on the morning of June lOth, and particularly
the waiver of notice, it would be apparent that if nothing
were said about the point by any witness the court would
assume the document was signed on April 1, 1953, and that
therefore it had been in existence prior to that date.
Before the minutes and waiver relating to the meeting
of April 1, 1953 were introduced in evidence they were
stapled into a book which contained the minutes of the
corporation and it seems apparent that if petitioner had
given the matter any thought and knowing as he did, that
he had an unreliable witness, he should have examined the
documents prepared in his office before they were introduced in evidence by his client. If, as petitioner claims, he
was taken by surprise and was shocked when Mr. Schnitzer
testified falsely regarding the documents, it seems reasonable to believe he would have taken a different course of
conduct than he did at some time between that date and
June 21st when Mr. Schnitzer and Mr. Hutchinson came
back on the stand to correct their testimony. It is probably
the fact to state that neither Schnitzer nor petitioner
thought Schnitzer would be subjected to such a penetrating
cross examination as he was given by Mr. Sherman.
The record indicates that Mr. Sherman was dealing
with a very difficult witness in Mr. Schnitzer, and petitioner
confirms his appraisal of his unwillingness to state the
facts under oath. This Court is not called upon to pass upon
whether Mr. Sherman was or was not justified in putting
a listening device in Mr. Schnitzer's room. Certainly the
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conduct of Mr. Sherman is not before this court for appraisal.
The records support the inference that Mr. Schnitzer
and Mr. Hutchinson went to court on the morning of June
lOth with the hope of having the court believe that the minutes and waiver had been prepared and signed in Oregon, the
waiver on or prior to Aprill, 1953, and the minutes at some
time shortly thereafter. It probably did not occur to Mr.
Schnitzer or Mr. Hutchinson or to petitioner, that Mr. Sherman was going to ask them about the details of the transaction and then be able to prove so clearly that they had perjured themselves.

It would appear that, in view of the fact that petitioner
knew he had an unreliable witness and had documents prepared in his office the morning of June lOth which were
going to be produced in court that day by his evasive client
(and it must be remembered that petitioner himself joined
in the production of these documents) , the least petitioner
could be expected to have done was to examine the documents to be introduced.
While the Supreme Court of Utah has held that the
perjury was upon an immaterial matter, the permitting by
petitioner of his client Schnitzer and witness Hutchinson to
prepare documents in his office under circumstances which
indicate that the said Schnitzer and Hutchinson would
likely evade the fact of preparation and also the time and
place thereof in the hope that the court would assume without Sherman's examination that the documents were prepared and signed in Portland on or about April 1, 1953,
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and then to testify as they did regarding said documents,
would appear to indicate a failure on the part of petitioner
to appreciate his duties and obligations as an attorney and
officer of the court, as expected by the Revised Rules of
the Utah State Bar Governing Professional Conduct and
Discipline involved herein.

CONCLUSION
By way of conclusion it may be appropriate for respondent to state further that assuming Mr. King and Mr. Black,
Mr. Schnitzer and Mr. Hutchinson held the conference testified to by Mr. King, Mr. Black and Mr. Schnitzer, as heretofore set out, during the lunch hour on June 10, 1954, at
which it was agreed that if Hutchinson was asked about
the preparation of the Waiver and Minutes he was instructed by both Mr. King and Mr. Schnitzer that he was to tell
the complete truth, it seems hard to understand why petitioner did not stand up before the Court while the witness
Hutchinson was lying about the matter, on the afternoon
of June lOth, and frankly disclose that the documents were
prepared in his office, using his typewriter and stenographer, on the morning of June lOth. It is hard to understand
that if petitioner and Mr. Black gave the positive and vigorous criticism to Mr. Schnitzer, according to their testimony, they would have nevertheless remained silent when
Mr. Hutchinson proceeded to evade and perjure himself
on the same matter in the afternoon.
There is much discussion in the record by petitioner
and Mr. Black about their uncertainty as to when they
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should disclose the truth to the court because they did not
wish to have their client Schnitzer and his secretary, Hutchinson, admit they were guilty of perjury, but if we are to
believe that they instructed Hutchinson to tell the truth
on the afternoon of June lOth that question, as we have
heretofore stated, had been resolved in favor of full and
fair disclosure on June lOth. The logical conclusion to be
reached from this state of facts is that either petitioner did
not advise witness Hutchinson to tell the truth on the afternoon of June lOth, or if he did and that advice was disregarded, it was his duty, as an attorney, at that point to
make a full disclosure to the court. Because of what actually transpired, it is apparent that Mr. King and Mr.
Black were not vitally concerned about the perjury of their
witnesses until that perjury was proven by Mr. Sherman's
independent evidence which was produced June 17th and
18th.
Respondent respectfully suggests to the Court that
petitioner should have disclosed the facts on June lOth and
on each trial date thereafter until June 21st. In the short
space of a page of testimony (Exhibit P-2, page 224) there
are two misstatements of fact by petitioner,-one, that Mr.
Hutchinson "left our office and dictated those minutes,"
and two, "that it was done about on the 5th". Petitioner
was not only failing to disclose the facts to the court but
was continuing in his efforts to conceal or evade the truth.
The fact that the difference between June lOth and June
5th and whether the dictation was in or out of Mr. King's
office may be immaterial to the issues in the lawsuit gives
added reason for him to state the facts.
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Respondent submits that the facts and law pertaining
to this matter appear to amply justify the sustaining by
this court of the findings and conclusions of the Disciplinary Committee and the recommendation of the Board of
Bar Commissioners.
Respectfully submitted,

LLEWELLYN 0. THOMAS,
ALLAN E. MECHAM,

Prosecuting Committee,
Utah State Bar.
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